During 2008 a series of allegations emerged is respect of systematic attempts to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR). In this paper we implement a version of the probability of informed trading measure first introduced in Easley et al. (1996) , for the Eurodollar futures market over the 1996 to 2013 period. The Eurodollar future is one of the most actively traded US Dollar LIBOR benchmarked derivatives in the world with total traded volume in excess of half a quadrillion US dollars in 2011 (Source: CFTC) and is possibly the world's largest financial market. The objective of this paper is an ex-post review of the effectiveness of the PIN in determining changes in the information structure of the market around documented episodes of recorded manipulation of the benchmark rate, from the various publicly available regulatory reports. In keeping with previous studies on interest rate derivatives, we find that the average PIN is far higher than for the equity market at or around 2/3 to 3/4. When implementing a rolling measure of the PIN to detect time variation we find a clear pattern of increases and decreases in informed trading relative to the recorded activity in the current regulatory reports. Furthermore, we also find a strong maturity effect that appears to arise from the strong time variation in trading in these contracts over their life-cycle, from inception to maturity. We construct a series of experiments to determine the significance of the trading time for different epochs from 1996 to 2014 using all inside quotes and trades in these contracts. Our results indicate that the PIN could have been used as an early warning of unusual activity in the LIBOR reference rate and anecdotally we demonstrate that on specific dates identified by the CFTC and FSA the recursively estimated PIN reaches a peak over 1,000 basis points higher for certain near-delivery contracts than for others further away in the forward curve.
Introduction
The London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the European InterBank Offered Rate (EU-RIBOR) act as a reference rate for the majority of interest rate derivatives traded in global markets. However, the probity of this rate-setting mechanism has been called into question and several cases of manipulation of the LIBOR fix have been recorded since 2008. This paper exploits new information released by the various regulatory cases and uses it to conduct a field test of a commonly used method to assess the degree of asymmetric information from the order flows of traded assets, in this case LIBOR referenced Eurodollar futures. The Eurodollar futures market is referenced to the three-month dollar LIBOR rate (henceforth 3M-LIBOR) for maturities out to ten years. We utilize a large sample of trade and quote data to estimate the probability of informed trading (PIN) using the model of Easley et al. (1996) . The results paint a mixed picture of the effectiveness of The comparison of the number of requests between 3M-USD LIBOR and other LIBOR currencies mentioned in CFTC documents in the matter of LIBOR manipulation for Barclays, RBS, UBS, Rabobank and Lloyds Bank.
the PIN for interest rate futures. In most of the documented cases the PIN varies from the longrun averages in a statistically distinctive manner; however, other effects, such as high-frequency quoting around maturity dates, are found to generate noise that has a similar impact on the PIN. The background of our experiment lies in the run-up to the 2007 financial turmoil and anomalies in the LIBOR rate in the immediate aftermath. An analysis conducted by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on May 29, 2008 suggested that banks may have reported flawed interest data for 3M-LIBOR 1 . The LIBOR is set by a panel of banks that report their borrowing costs for various maturities and a censored mean is then taken that eliminates the top four and bottom four of the distribution leaving an average of the middle eight banks (see Table 2 ). Since no transactions may have been made that day for many maturities, an estimate of the rate is offered to fill in the blanks. The WSJ article indicated that the banks may have been suppressing their borrowing costs to conceal signs of financial distress, and subsequent investigation by global regulators found that the bank has indeed the case during the period from 2008 to 2010. The investigation also uncovered a systematic manipulation of the rates pre-2007 and indicated that the motivation for this activity was to assist the parts of the banks that traded in interest rate derivatives. This precrisis period will be the focus of the paper, since the documented events provide direct evidence of heterogeneous information across traders in specific markets such as derivative market. According to the current set of regulatory documents released, as of July 2014, most of the requests for fix adjustments by derivatives traders to various bank rate setters directly focus on the 3M-LIBOR rate. While many derivatives contracts are closely associated with this rate, the largest by far in terms of notional outstanding, is the futures contract on a three-month Eurodollar contract (see Table 1 ).
This paper provides evidence for the effectiveness of the PIN model in actually detecting informed behaviour in the Eurodollar futures market. To accomplish this we collect all trades and inside quotes for Eurodollar futures from 1996 to 2014, a data set in excess of two billion observations. We believe this to be the largest study of its type ever conducted. We will compute the PIN using a variety of approaches and construct test groups to see whether the PIN varies systematically with the events suggested in the regulatory filings, versus a set of controls. In general, our control groups show average PIN variation around "normal" events in the futures contract life-cycle -in this case the maturity of the contract.
The reports on LIBOR manipulation for each bank provide us with a unique field experiment to test the PIN as the number of events is very large and the specificity of the objectives of those involved is very clearly stated. It is worth reviewing the rationale behind this approach. The PIN seeks to detect trades that appear to be the result of informed signals prior to some pay-off event.
For equities the future dividend is often somewhat nebulous at higher frequencies, however in futures markets it is not. Each day the outstanding contracts are marked to market using the last one minute of trading or the mid-price of the final outstanding quotes. At maturity the contracts are settled to cash based on the price of 100 minus the 3M-LIBOR on the third Wednesday of the settlement month. It should be stressed that for all "manipulation" is supposed to take place in the reference rate (the 3M-LIBOR) and not directly in the Eurodollar itself.
Our foundational assumption is that given that a particular bank is able to influence the reference rate and hence possibly influence the mark to market and certainly influence the final settlement price, then the traders of this bank will have more complete information on the final payoff of this asset over both the trading days and over the overall maturity of the contract. This informational advantage should then be reflected in the PIN, relative to days when no manipulation of the reference rate took place. We will illustrate using examples and summary statistics from the regulatory reports that requests from derivatives traders tended to take place with relatively short notice periods of between one day and one week. The degree of variation in the reference rate that can be created by "high or low balling" the rate is relatively small. However, we will also illustrate that the size of the notional positions in the Eurodollar market is so large that there is still a significant incentive to shave the reference rate in your favour.
Overall, our findings are mixed. We find that the PIN reacts strongly to certain types of events and the variation is statistically significant relative to our control group. However, the PIN is always very high for Eurodollar futures market, PIN is averaging over 0.5 for the majority of our sample, compared to the equity market where observed PIN, for which the PIN usually varies between 0.1 and 0.6 from a survey of prior studies. We also find that the PIN is not stable relative to the various estimation assumptions. However, because this is almost entirely driven by the instability of the "trade classification" algorithm used to determine buying pressure, we leave full investigation of this issue to future work. This paper is organized as follows §(2) reviews the current research on detecting informed trading. §(3) provides a detailed background to interest rate derivatives including LIBOR and Eurodollar Futures trading on CME's Globex. §(4) outlines the version of the PIN model used in this study. §(5) includes data sources and data pre-processing. §(6) explores the PIN and presents the empirical results. Finally, §(7) provides some conclusions and outlines directions for future work in this area.
Related Work
Markets are mechanisms that process information. When forward pay-offs follow a semimartingale process the act of buying and selling claims on these pay-offs should approach a fair bet. The act of buying and selling assets in a continuous Walrasian is a mechanism by which the fragments of information possessed by each trader are disseminated into the market as a whole. Classical models of markets, such as those that underlie the capital asset pricing model and most base-models of derivatives pricing assume that, while information provided by traders in the market may not be homogeneous, individual traders make homogeneous statistical assumptions about the quality of their private signals. Thus, the semi-martingale assumption of the evolution of the fundamental value and the resulting price of the asset is preserved. However, most models of market microstructure assume that traders both receive heterogeneous signals and have heterogeneous information about the quality of those signals.
The study of market microstructure in the presence of information asymmetries in the financial securities market has received considerable attention from academics and practitioners, and in their seminal work Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) explain the relationship between market efficiency and pieces of information. They argue that it is impossible for markets to be perfectly efficient in terms of information because if they were, the return for gathering information would be nil, in which case there would be little reason to trade and the markets would eventually collapse. Alternatively, the degree of market inefficiency determines the effort investors are willing to expend to gather and trade information; hence a non-degenerate market equilibrium will only arise when there are sufficient opportunities for profit, i.e. inefficiency, to compensate investors for the cost of trading and information-gathering. The profits earned by these industrious investors may be viewed as economic rents that accrue to those willing to engage in such activities. Hellwig (1980) outlines some theoretical models of how asset prices evolve when a subset of traders have private information. He explains how a competitive market serves to disseminate information between the market participants. The communication process in a market is usually described by the phrase that the equilibrium price reflects all the available information in the market and communicates it to participants. This area of study has expanded in the last two decades and in terms of approaches, the noisy rational expectation equilibrium of Admati (1985) uses price information for a model of multi-asset risk.
Building on work published in the preceding year on the industrial organization of futures markets, Kyle (1985) constructs a dynamic model of insider trading with sequential auctions, structured to resemble a sequential equilibrium to examine the informational content of prices, the liquidity characteristics of a speculative market, and the value of private information to an insider. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) propose that the trading of informed traders who have superior information leads to a positive bid-ask spread, even when the specialist is risk neutral and makes zero expected profits. Although, the informed trader is risk neutral, the profit that he gets is the loss from uninformed trader. The work of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) developed a research model in which traders determine when to trade and whether to become privately informed about assets' future returns. They study was inspired by three questions, the first of which was why does trading tend to be concentrated in particular time periods within the trading day? Secondly, why are returns (or price changes) more variable in some periods and less variable in others? Thirdly, why do the periods of higher trading volume also tend to be the periods of higher return variability? Thus, the model development is based on research in which traders determine when to trade and whether to become privately informed about assets' future returns. Easley and O'Hara (1987) investigate the effect of trade size on security prices when informed traders prefer to trade larger volumes at any price, so that market makers' trading strategies should depend on the size of the trade. As a result, market makers pricing strategies must also depend on trade size with large trades being made at less favorable prices. This model provides an explanation for the price effect of block trading and demonstrates that both the size and sequence of trades matter when determine the price-trade size relationship. Easley and O'Hara (1992) developed a model that observes the informed trading of a sequential trade model from the learning process of order flow similar to that of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O'Hara (1987) in which arriving orders are updated in a probabilistic fashion, independent of any parameters. This model was nicknamed the PIN and has subsequently proved to be very popular because of its ease of implementation. It is used to measure the impact of different portions of information from traders on market liquidity and price formation. The PIN can explain the link between the existence of information, trading time and security prices. The time affects the prices, trading can move price quotes, and the time between trades affects the spread; for instance, the spread decreases as the time increases and whether informed trader trade or do not trade will correspond to the volume. Informed traders will reveal their private information for trade; they will buy (sell) if they observe good (bad) news. Therefore, this method is built on a pattern of buy and sell orders, which is interpreted as stemming from information arrivals that appear in the market. Easley et al. (1996) investigate the differences in spreads for active and infrequently traded stocks by using an information-based trading approach with a sample of stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The findings show that the probability of informed trading is lower for active than inactive stock; however, although high volume of stock tends to have more informed traders, the increase of uninformed traders has a greater effect. Easley et al. (1996) proceed with a mixed continuous and discrete time-sequential trade model of the trading process in which the trading day's trade arises from a group of informed traders and uninformed traders, and also price movements arise from the quotes. Informed trading occurs on the trading day and the decisions are made based on their private information. This information trade-based approach is different in application from that of Hasbrouck (1991) who examines the information in trade innovations as a vector autoregressive.
Possible explanations of price processes and the number of trades influenced by information content are demonstrated by Easley et al. (1997a,b) when they examine the trade and price process in the electronic market order flow using high-frequency data, as well as by Brown et al. (1999) . Easley et al. (1997b) criticize Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , both of which identify the behaviour of uninformed traders who are assumed to be serially independent; however, if uninformed traders act strategically, then these microstructure models are misspecified. The Easley et al. (1997b) model enables uniformed traders to become buyers and sellers following independent or dependent processes. The model includes variations in trade sizes to estimate informational versus trade volumes. The results of these studies show that both large and small traded stocks are widely affected by private information; however, large trades have approximately twice the information content of small trades and uninformed traders who make decisions based on their recent trading are more likely buy (sell) when the last trade was a (buy) sell.
The PIN has been widely adopted in a variety of studies in empirical financial literature; for instance, Easley et al. (2001) use NYSE common stocks that had two to one splits in 1995 to investigate how stock splits affect trading in the presence of uninformed and informed traders. After stock splits, there is a slight increase in uninformed trading and a tendency to execute trades using market orders. This evidence is consistent with the increase in uninformed trading so that the problem of adverse selection is not materially reduced. Also, the parameter estimates after stock splits suggest that it does not significantly change the stock information environment. Moreover, the results of the Heidle and Huang (2002) information-based study of the probability of informed trading in dealer and auction markets show that associated changes in the probability of trading with informed traders are related to changes in the bid-ask spread; also, there is more probability of an informed traders' confrontation in dealer markets than in auction markets. Grammig et al. (2001) extend the Easley et al. (1996) model to allow for a simultaneous estimation of two parallel markets in order to analyse whether the number of anonymous traders is related to informationbased trading using the German stock market to answer the question, which trading platform do traders prefer? They find that the probability of informed trading is significantly lower in floor-based trading systems than in anonymous electric trading systems. Easley et al. (2002) and Aslan et al. (2011) expand the main financial literature that focuses on asset pricing to theoretical market microstructure pricing models in the presence of asymmetric information. They investigate the effect of the role of private information-based trading on asset returns. Easley et al. (2002) uses individual NYSE-listed stocks between 1983 and 1998 to measure the probability of information-based trading incorporated with a Fama and French asset pricing framework. The main outcome of their study is that information does affect asset prices; specifically, where there is a 10% difference in the probability of informed trading between two stocks, this leads to a 2.5% percent difference in their expected return. Similarly, Aslan et al. (2011) investigate the link between private information-based trading and accounting and asset pricing by developing a proxy for the PIN (PPIN) to investigate the role of information risk in asset pricing over longer time periods. They conclude that informed trading captured by the PPIN is both statistically and economically significant for asset returns; for instance, firms with higher PPINs have higher returns, and this conclusion is robust in every asset pricing structure explored.
The structure of private and public information and post-earnings announcement drift by using the PIN has been extensively analysed by Vega (2006) using a comprehensive public news database. The results of this study show that informed traders tend to learn about the true value of an asset and stocks linked with a high PIN from public surprising news; conversely, low media coverage causes an insignificant drift. Also, most small stocks realise a greater post-announcement drift than large stocks, which tend to be more transparent. Another analysis involving the PIN appears in Ascioglu et al. (2008) who try to fill the gap between the investment issue in corporate finance literature and liquidity in the market microstructure. This study provides strong evidence that asymmetric information decreases firm investment and increases the sensitivity of investment expenditure to fluctuation in internal funds. It also illustrates that the strength of the results of the PIN is consistent with the evidence in the market microstructure, that the PIN is by far the most relevant and direct measure of asymmetric information and it should be one of significant factor for asset pricing in the Fama and French framework. Another study involving the corporate investment decision is that of Chen et al. (2007) , the results of which show that the measure of the amount of private information in stock prices and the probability of informed trading have a strong positive effect on the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock prices. Also, Brockman and Yan (2009) study the stock value with the relationship of the block holders and the amount of specific information. The results strongly support that block ownership and firm-specific information have a significant impact on the stock return.
Studies of the market microstructure in the presence of the PIN that impacts the price of risky assets were undertaken by Kang (2010) , Idier and Nardelli (2011) and Chen and Zhao (2012) . Firstly, Kang (2010) investigates the relationship between the probability of information-based trading and the January effect, the so-called "January PIN effect". He finds that the mean stock returns decrease with the PIN in January, contrary to other calendar months, and that this effect is more significant for small stocks. As stated in his work, the January PIN effect is associated with selling pressure in December, especially of small stock. As a result, this seasonal effect leads to a negative relationship between the PIN and returns, and when the price bounces back in January, low-PIN stocks will exhibit a larger return within a small stock group. Secondly, Idier and Nardelli (2011) apply the PIN model developed by Easley et al. (1996) to analyse the role and impact of information-based trading on the Euro overnight market rate. They find that the PIN sharply declined after the reform of the Eurosystem's operational framework in March 2004 and the recent financial market turmoil. Finally, Chen and Zhao (2012) use the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) to investigate the effect of informed trading (PIN) and information uncertainty when determining the price momentum. The results show that momentum trading strategies based on buying high-uncertainty good-news stocks and short selling high-uncertainty bad-news stocks only work well when applied to stock with a high PIN. In contrast, this pattern is not exhibited with low-PIN stocks, even when the uncertainty level of those stocks is high.
In view of all that has been mentioned so far, one may suppose that the studies of market microstructure in the presence of informed trading by using a probability of informed trading approach is a stabilized measurement tool for asymmetry information. While the PIN approach is quite popular for securities trading, only a tiny portion of the literature is involved with the interest rate derivative market. Thus, the gap in these previous studies offers a great opportunity to test some of the current measures of informed trading such as the PIN approach of Easley et al. (1996) with a very liquid interest rate derivative market.
Background of Interest Rate Derivatives Market and LIBOR Manipulation
The purpose of this research is to investigate the comparative microstructure of the Eurodollar Future markets during the LIBOR manipulation event. As a useful natural experiment, the incident of LIBOR manipulation offers a great opportunity for academics to impute and observe parameters of interest in an information asymmetry model and to study the development of those estimators incorporated with the information content.
To understand the Eurodollar futures based on 3-M US Dollar LIBOR, it is deemed to be useful to introduce the background of the London InterBank Offered Rate or the LIBOR, since this is the benchmark or key interest rate for Eurodollar futures. The original LIBOR was introduced in 1984, when the BBA or British Bankers' Association and other parties, such as the Bank of England, formed a standard settlement rate of contractual terms on interest rate swaps. Two years later, the BBA published the first LIBOR as an official interest rate for a variety of financial instruments transacted across the multi-international financial market, notably syndicated loans, forward rate agreements, interest rate futures, interest rate swaps, and interest rate options (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012) . The LIBOR submission in now administered by the NYSE: ICE LIBOR unit. At 11.00 am on each weekday, the panel banks submit their rates to an administrator. Then, the highest four and the lowest four of the quoted rates are removed and the remaining middle rates are used to calculate a simple arithmetic mean. Finally, at 11.30am LIBOR is quoted and announced by Thomson Reuters. Since September 2013 the ICE LIBOR unit makes the fixing available to various data vendors (including Thomson Reuters) for distribution to the market and for settlement on maturing interest rate derivatives set relative to this rate. Currently, the daily LIBOR rates are quoted on 10 major currencies, including the Australian Dollar, British Pound, Canadian Dollar, European Euro, Danish Kroner, Japanese Yen, New Zealand Dollar, Swedish Kroner, Swiss Franc and US Dollar.
In London, the LIBOR rate is based on the rates quoted by 16 banks selected by the BBA to provide a daily rate for LIBOR calculation. As a benchmark of interest rates, the LIBOR is widely used for various financial instruments including standard interbank products such as forward rate agreement, interest rate swaps, interest rate futures, mortgage rates, standard loan rates and Eurodollar Futures trading. Likewise, in the United States around 60 to 80% of prime adjustable rate mortgages and sub-prime mortgages were indexed to the US LIBOR. In addition, the American municipalities borrowed around 75% of their money through products that were linked to the LIBOR.
Eurodollar Futures
By definition, Eurodollars are US Dollar deposits located outside the legal jurisdiction of the United States. The majority of Eurodollar deposits are located in London, however the Eurodollar deposit account really has very little to do with the futures contract named after it. The Eurodollar future contract made its debut in December 1981 on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and this was the first future contract ever settled to cash. Since the transaction market for the Eurodollar futures contract is not so well understood outside the interest rate derivative community, we will explain the specifics in some detail in this section.
The Eurodollar futures themselves are interest rate derivatives with reference to the 3M London interbank offered rate (LIBOR), that have a face value of $1 million with a 3-month maturity and the futures contracts have a maturity of up to ten years. The regular contracts expire either in March, June, September or December, extending outwardly for 40 quarterly expiring contracts in the long term; shorter maturity monthly contracts are traded, however, their relative volume, trading activity and quoting activity are several orders of magnitude lower than the quarterly contracts. The last trading day is the second business day prior to the third Wednesday of the delivery month in both New York and London. At any given time, the exchange lists four of the monthly series, bringing the total number of available Eurodollar future contract maturity types to 44 -namely, 40 quarterly and 4 monthly serial contracts.
Eurodollar futures are traded around the clock on Central Standard Time (CST; Chicago time) from Sunday to Friday, 23 hours a day. On a typical trading day, the CME is divided into two stages: the per-opening trading stage and the bilateral stage. The Eurodollar futures are exchanged exclusively in the open outcry on regular CME floor trading between 7:20 am to 2:00 pm. In addition, trading on Globex solely begins at 5:00 pm CST on Sunday, which represents the beginning of Monday's trading, and continues to operate overnight until 4:00 pm CST on the following day. However, Globex closes for regularly scheduled maintenance between 4:00 pm and 5.00 pm CST every day. For instance, 5:00 pm on Sunday represents the beginning of the trading session for Monday's trading day and it continues until 4:00 pm on Friday, when Globex closes for the weekend and re-opens again at 5:00 pm on Sunday to begin the next week's trading. Currently, more than 70% of Eurodollar futures are traded simultaneously on the electronic trading platform; CME Globex platform, 2 since it offers more liquidity and has lower transaction costs. futures, both short and long, are used extensively to finance and/or replicate the floating leg of swap contracts and the notional outstanding in these contracts has grown in concert with the notional size of the swap market (indeed according to CME the aggregate size of outstanding Eurodollar futures is usually about 10% larger than the swap market. Swap contract floating rate rebalancing is commonly conducted at or near the quarterly international money market (IMM) dates that correspond to the delivery dates on the quarterly Eurodollar futures.
The Eurodollar future is an interest rate future contract that is particularly related to the LIBOR -therefore, the price is quoted to 100 (or the total price is equal to 100 less the implied 3M-US Dollar LIBOR interest rate). For instance, if the implied interest rate is 0.250%, the IMM index is quoted as 99.750 (IMM Index = 100.000 -0.250% = 99.750), and this is also the price of a futures contract. The gain or loss of these contracts is described by one basis point (0.01%), which equates to a 25.00 US dollar movement in contract value, derived as follows: $1 million notional loan ×(0.01%) × (90/360) = $25.00. However, the minimum price fluctuation is set at half a basis point or 0.005%, equal to $12.50, based on $1 million face value 90-day instruments. For example, if the price was rising from 96.99 at the beginning of the day and closed at 97.00 (implying a LIBOR decrease from 3.01 to 3.00%), $25 is paid from the seller's margin account into that of the buyer so that buying the contract is equivalent to lending money, and selling the contract short is equivalent to borrowing it.
Individually, Eurodollar futures, in effect, parallel forward rate agreements (FRAs), but provide more liquidity by virtue of the clearing house and being marked to market. Of key importance is the cash settlement -Eurodollar traders will receive cash compensation on the same day rather than having to wait until the expiry date. Moreover, large institutions tend to use Eurodollar futures to manage their risk or portfolio to avoid interest rate risk. To hedge against this risk, borrowers will enter into short future contracts to avoid the risk of rising interest rates while lenders will enter into long future contracts to avoid the risk of falling interest rates. However, there are speculators who purely seek to make a profit from Eurodollar trading by betting on the change in interest rates (future directional). Institutional investors will use Eurodollar futures contracts to lock in an interest rate today for their borrowing or lending in the future. Eurodollar futures are the most widely traded short-term interest rate futures in the world, with average daily volume of more than 2 million. Futures contracts are the most active interest rate futures traded in the world, typically in the 7 to 9 million range in the shortest maturity futures. 3
The Current LIBOR Manipulation Cases
Our analysis of informed trading in the Eurodollar Futures market in this paper relates to documents published by both the media and financial regulators. However, our core source will be the CFTC reports relating to the current group of banks and brokers that have settled a fines with various national regulatory bodies. As of August 25, 2014 this group consists of Barclays, UBS, RBS and Rabobank. Each bank has been investigated and fined by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the Financial Services Authority (FSA). The documentation of manipulation of the LIBOR reference rate will be based on each bank's report. Overall, the reports cover a period of seven years from 2005 to 2012. We will also focus on the reports primarily relating to the 3M US LIBOR submissions as this is the reference for our Eurodollar data. The FSA (2012) report documents the earliest LIBOR manipulation event in 2005 when Barclays' derivatives employees made a total of 257 requests to Barclays LIBOR submitter to set the submission rate for LIBOR and Euribor. This was a routine request related to their derivatives trading positions and their own bonuses. Figure 1 shows an example graph showing that Barclays' submission was consistent with certain requests. For example, on November 22, 2005, Barclays' swap trader made a request in relation to Barclays' 3M US dollar LIBOR submission: "We have to get kicked out of the fixings tomorrow; we need a 4.41 fix in 3M (high fix)". The submitter sent a positive response to this request. Figure 1 shows the change in Barclays' submission compared to other panel banks' submission and the final 3M rate. Figure 1 shows that Barclays' 3M US dollar LIBOR submission, which had been at the final benchmark rate, increased to a level above the benchmark rate on the day the swap trader requested a higher submission. It then remained high at the same level as the benchmark rate and finally increased again until the benchmark rate reached 4.41 as the swap trader had requested. Therefore, Barclays' submissions, on November 22, 2005 and later that week, were consistent with the request for a high 3M US Dollar LIBOR. The LIBOR investigation also shown that artificial rate had been tight in both high and low fixing, for instance, May 23, 2007 the Barclays swaps trader requested the submitter to submit a low LIBOR at 5.36 for tomorrow (May 24, 2007) as he sent email to submitter 'Pls., go for 5.36 again tomorrow, very long and would be hurt by higher setting...Thank.', then on May 23, 2007 Barclay submitted the 3M-USD LIBOR at 5.36 and the LIBOR was announced at 5.36 as their swap trader request. Another example was September 04, 2007 regarding to CFTC report the UBS swap trader explained to their manager why they requested a low LIBOR submission, so their submitter submitted a low rate at 5.2(see Table 2 for Barclay's LIBOR submission). There is substantial evidence that Barclays' LIBOR fix was consistently manipulated during the volatile global conditions of the sub-prime crisis (circa 2007-2008) , in order to manage what it believed were inaccurate and negative public and media perceptions that it had a liquidity problem, by lowering its submissions -which were believed to be too low (see p. 3, CFTC, 2012) . This activity continued after BNP Paribas House's hedge funds had been frozen followed by the collapse of Northern Rock and Lehman Brothers. Finally, after Barclays raised £7.3 billion of capital from its Qatari shareholders, the CFTC began an investigation in the United States into the suspected "low-balling" of LIBOR submissions by global banks. 4 In early December 2007, a Barclays' employee alerted the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) in which LIBOR rate setting at a dishonesty level was discussed (see p. 22, CFTC, 2012) .
The analysis is continued by comparing the LIBOR submission rates with the benchmark rate before and after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Figure 2 and Table 2 are examples of graphs and table showing that panel banks submitted rates that were believed to be abnormally low before the collapse of Lehman Brothers (June 18, 2008) . When the end of Lehman Brothers made it clear to everybody that the crisis would last, the LIBOR rose sharply, whereas it had dropped heavily during the previous period to an almost "normal" level for an almost normal situation, but an abnormal level for a critical one (October 15, 2008) .
In order to track the LIBOR manipulation, Timothy Geithner, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at that time, sent a document containing a proposal for consultation to tackle the problem to Sir Mervyn King, the governor of the Bank of England. 5 After receiving this document from the New York Fed, the FSA in London officially joined the international investigation, as a result of which the CFTC broadened its investigation. It decided to cooperate with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and began to communicate with multinational regulators, such as the European Commission (EC), the Swiss Competition Commission (COMCO), The Canada's Competition Bureau and the Japanese Regulator. A major effect of this cooperation was that the Swiss bank UBS agreed to end a tax dispute over US citizens and hand over 4,450 account details to assist the LIBOR investigation.
The FSA launched an investigation into Barclays to respond to allegations of LIBOR manipulation in June 2010, and in 2011, the FTC Capital and Charles Schwab Corporation filed a lawsuit against 12 major banks, including Barclays, RBS, HSBC and Lloyds, claiming that they had conspired to depress the LIBOR artificially. 6 After the investigation, some of the major banks that were found to have manipulated the LIBOR rate, including Barclays and UBS, were fined by Commodity Futures From extensive textual analysis of the current settlements, it is evident that the 3M-LIBOR is the most commonly mentioned rate, followed by the 1M-LIBOR. A summary of the evidence of the abuse of the 3M-LIBOR and 1M-LIBOR is provided in Table 3 , with an example of the communication content between traders and LIBOR submitters during the LIBOR manipulation. The supervisor said "if the submitters submitted the rate for a particular tenor at 5.50, which was the rate they believed to be the appropriate submission", Barclays would be twenty basic points above the pack and it's going to causes shit storm.
Low setting
Dec 4 17/12/07 Barclays The Barclays senior US Dollar LIBOR submitter emails his supervisor.
[SIC] He stating that he submitted Barclays' 1m LIBOR at 5.30%, which was 4 basic points over the next highest submission and almost five basic points over the LIBOR FIXING.
High setting US Dollar Trader-Submitter state that "we will start lowering over the next few days to get to more or less middle of the pack until future notice did you need me for any thing else?" ALM Manager replied "nope that was it, thx we should bring it down fast so we are in line by friday with the pack".
This is a synthesis of reports from the CFTC, FSA and FCA on the inappropriate US Dollar LIBOR submissions by employees of Barclays, Rabobank and UBS from 2005 to 2008. It focuses on the US dollar submission, particularly anything relating to 3-month submissions. The majority of reports on manipulation refer to the 1-month and 3-month LIBOR rates, predominantly the 3-month. This can be attributed to the fact that the Eurodollar Future is primarily a 3-month forward LIBOR rate, while the 1-month rates are commonly used for the floating rate leg of fixed to floating swaps. Since these are the products that have the highest notional valuations outstanding, they have the most potential for profitable informed trades.
The model

Probability of Informed Trading -PIN
The PIN is a measure of asymmetric information on a trading event between informed and uninformed trading, which was developed on the theoretical framework of Easley and O'Hara (1992) , although the original PIN approach was introduced by Easley et al. (1996) . They produced a mixed discrete-time and continuous-time sequential model of the trading mechanism, in which trades emerge when three classifications of economic agents -namely market makers, informed traders and uninformed traders collaborate. Abad and Yagüe (2012) , explain that on trading day, market maker is competitive or strategic trader, informed and uninformed traders are risk neutral with probability of profit or loss at 0.5. Also, informed and uninformed traders arrive in the market with their unique arrival rate with a view to a trading game between the liquidity provider and trader. Despite this, the PIN is not a direct measurement observation, but rather a parameter of a microstructure model which is estimated by the numerical maximization of the likelihood function. This is explained by Easley et al. (1996) , as considering the likelihood of the arrival of three different types of information on a trading day: no news, good news, and bad news. This set of options for market agents can be summarized in a standard tree diagram representing the trading process. This diagram gives the structure of the trading process, where α is the probability of an information event, δ is the probability of a low signal, µ is the rate of informed trade arrivals, and ε is the rate of uninformed buy and sell rate arrivals.
The tree in 3 describes the trading process of Easley et al. (1996) . Individual trading periods of a single risky asset on trading days are indexed i = 1, 2, . . . , I and time is continuous within a trading day, and is indexed by t ∈ [0, T ]. The competitive market makers are ready to buy or sell the asset at bid and ask posted price during the trading period. Information events are independently distributed at the beginning of each trading day, and occur with probability α. However, informed traders will only trade on information event days; they will buy an asset if they receive a signal of good news with probability 1 − δ and sell if they receive a signal of bad news with probability δ. As ε b and ε s are the selling and buying rate of uninformed traders, which are supposed to have the same intensity (0.5), therefore the probability of uninformed traders is ε s = ε b = ε. In this way, the set of parameters are reduced to only four: α, δ, µ and ε.
On a trading day, trade occurs from both uninformed traders and informed traders who trade on condition of a received signal. Both types of uninformed buyers and sellers arrive in the market at rate ε. Competitive informed traders who are risk neutral will arrive on the trading days on which the information events have occurred. If they receive a signal of good news, they will arrive to buy orders; conversely, they will submit sell orders if they receive a bad signal or bad news. The arrival rate for this process is µ. These arrival processes are assumed to be independent. Then, on good event days, the arrival rate for buy orders is ε + µ and for sell orders is ε. On the other hand, if there is any bad news or bad signal on any trading day, the arrival rate of sell orders is Note: that when the fix is high, the price of the contract will decrease and when the fix is low the price will be higher, if the bank can guarantee than its fix will impact the LIBOR average determination.
ε + µ and buy orders arrive at a rate of µ. Finally, if there is no news or no signal on that day, only uninformed traders arrive for both buy and sell orders at arrival rate ε.
In each period the news arrival contains one of the three types of information. The market maker knows that there is some probability attached to each branch, and he knows the order arrival process for this branch. However, the market maker does not know which of the three branches has been naturally selected. Since he cannot directly observe which type of branch has been selected, Easley et al. (1996) assumes that the market maker is a Bayesian who uses the arrival of trade and the rate of trading to update his beliefs about the nature of the information event on the trading day. Let P (t) = (P n (t), P b (t), P g (t)) be a liquidity provider's belief about the occurrence of information event "no news" (n), "bad news" (b), and "good news" (g) at time t. Then, his prior beliefs at time 0 is P (t 0 ) = (1 − α, αδ, α(1 − δ)) .
To determine quotes at time t, the market maker updates his prior belief on the condition of an arrival order of the relevant type. For instance, the bid at time t, B(t), is the expected value of the asset conditional both on the history of the process prior to the arrival of order at time t and on the fact that someone wants to sell the asset. Let (s t ) denote the event that a sell order arrives at time t. Let P n (t|s t ) be the market maker's updated belief vector conditional on the history prior to time t and on the event that a sell order arrives at time t.
Following Bayes' rule, the market maker's posterior probability on no news at time t, if an order to sell arrives at t, is
the posterior probability on bad news is 2) and the posterior probability on good news is
Comparable to the case of buy orders (B t ) the posterior probability on good news at time t is
the posterior probability on bad news is 5) and the posterior probability on no news is
At the end of the trading on any day, the full information value of the asset is realized. If it is good news on trading day (i) the informed trader knows that the value of the asset at the end of the day is worthS i , similarly it is S i if it is bad news on day i and the asset on day i is worth
if there is no news at all. To complete the bid or ask at time t, the liquidity provider updates his position on the condition of arrival order according to information type. At time t the expected value of the asset, conditional on the history of trade prior to time t, is
where S * i = δS i + (1 + δ)S i is the prior expected value of the asset. The bid is the expected value of the asset conditional on someone wanting to sell the asset to a liquidity provider. Thus, it is
Similarly, the ask is the expected value of the asset conditional on someone wanting to buy the asset from a liquidity provider. Thus, it is
If there is no news on a trading day, so there are no informed traders (µ = 0), then both bid and ask are equal to the expected value of the asset. Generally, both informed and uninformed traders will be in the market, so A(t) > E[S i |t] > B(t). The bid-ask spread at time t is denoted by Σ(t) = A(t) − B(t). This spread is
The first term in the bid-ask spread equation is a probability of buy order based on information and the second is the term for sells. The spread for the initial quotes in the period, Σ, has a particularly simple form in the natural case in which good and bad events are equally likely. That is, if δ = 1 − δ, then Σ = αµ αµ + 2ε
The key component of this model is the probability that an order is from an informed trader, which is called the PIN: 12) where αµ + 2ε is the arrival rate for all orders and αµ is the arrival rate for information-based orders. Therefore, the PIN is a measure of the fraction of orders that arise from informed traders relative to the overall order flow, and the spread equation shows that it is the key determinant of spreads. These equations clarify that liquidity providers need to correctly estimate the PIN in order to identify the optimal levels at which to enter the market. An unanticipated increase in PIN will result in losses to those liquidity providers who do not adjust their prices. It is difficult to estimate the parameter vector θ = (α, δ, ε, µ) because it cannot be directly observed in either the occurrence of information events or the associated arrival of uninformed and informed traders. In fact, in terms of measuring the daily arrival rate of sell (s t ) and buy (b t ) it is possible to infer these values using maximum likelihood and assuming that the trading process follows a Poisson process (Karyampas and Paiardini, 2011) .
The Easley et al. (1996) PIN approach considers the likelihood of order arrivals on a day of known type. In this model, the likelihood of observing sell S and buy B orders on each type of information occurs on a no event day with probability 1 − α, a bad event day with probability αδ and a good event day with probability α(1 − δ). Thus, the likelihood is
Since only one type of information occurred on trading days, the maximum likelihood estimator of the information event parameters α and δ will be either 0 or 1. However, these parameters can be estimated from the daily numbers of buy and sells, assuming that the days are independent. The likelihood of observing the data M = (B i , S i ) I i=1 across I days is just the product of the daily likelihood function
(4.14)
The PIN estimates are computed by maximizing the parameter vector θ from any data set M , which is normally taken to be from the daily trades and quotes. For certain experiments we also use 30, 60 and 90 day PIN estimates, these experiments are described in the following section.
Trade Classification Algorithms
Since the classification of trades is one of the fundamental issues to analyse the PIN, it is essential to identify the direction of trading in terms of buying or selling. An important feature of the ED futures contract database is that it only records transactions that include Trades and Quotes, in particular price and quantity, but is not able to classify the trades. In order to determine whether a trade is initiated by a buy-side or sell-side, it is necessary to use trade classification techniques developed in the literature. Therefore, a brief description of trade classification approaches is provided in this section.
Tick Rule
The tick rule is widely used for trade classification captures the natural intuition that buyers pay a higher price and sellers get a lower price. Therefore, it assumes that trades are buys if the trade price is higher than the previous one; on the other hand, if the trade price is lower than the previous one, it is assumed that the trade is a sell. If the trade price remains stable compared to the previous price, the trade is assumed to be the same as the previous trade. Price data (Level 1 data) is needed for this classification and every trades can be classified. criticize this approach because the tick rule focuses only on price movements. The questions about the accuracy of this classification are especially relevant in HFT. In HFT, where the price moves up and down at super-speed succession within the order book, trades tend to be misclassified. Another problem is misclassification from hidden orders when there is no price movement. For instance, if the direction of the previous trade was a buy followed by trade with a hidden sell order at midpoint the same as the buy price, this trade will later be incorrectly classified as a buy.
Quote Rule
The quote rule classification demands more data than the tick rule, since it requires the best bid and ask quotes. This method classifies a trade as a buy when it occurs above the best bid and ask midpoint and conversely, it will be classified as a sell when it occurs below the midpoint. When the trade appears at the midpoint it is unclassified. Despite the fact that this method requires more data than the tick rule and should therefore provide more accurate results in classifying the trade, it is problematic given that a large number of trades appearing at mid-quote are misclassified ). This incorrect classification should increase in HFT when quotes change more frequently than trades execute, which means that a trade may be classified as ask at the current trade when, in fact, it took place as a bid. Equally, this incorrect classification occurs in less liquid trading with thinner order books.
Lee-Ready Algorithm
Another widely used technique to classify the direction of trade is the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, which is a combination of the tick rule and the quote rule. Lee and Ready examined a sample of the trading of 150 NYSE companies in 1988 when criticizing the tick rule, and the Lee-Ready algorithm also identifies some problems with the quote rule. The original Lee-Ready algorithm specified a 5 s delay in comparing trades to quotes. The following rules apply when using this method to classify trades:
1. For a trade, if the inside (best bid (ask)) quote has not changed within the preceding 5 s and the price is equal to the bid (ask), the trade is then classified as a sell (buy). 2. When the current quotes appear for less than 5 s, the trade direction is compared with the previous quotes. 3. When the trade price is outside the inside spread, so that the current trade price is lower (higher) than the best bid (ask), the trade is classified as a sell (buy). 4. If the transaction is at the midpoint the Lee-Ready algorithm uses a tick rule to classify the trade. 5. Tick rule: when the price is between the spread but not at the midpoint, the trade is classified as a sell (buy) when the price is closer to the bid (ask).
The Lee-Ready algorithm is the main classification for the PIN because of its accuracy. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) reported a 93% success rate when they applied this method to 144 NYSE stocks traded between November 1990 and January 1991 using a TORQ database. Finucane (2000) reported an 84.4% accuracy of 337,667 trades for all 144 firms in the NYSE TORQ database, while Odders-White (2000) found 85% accuracy using a TORQ database of 318,364 transactions. Ellis et al. (2000) used a data set of 313 NASDAQ firms that contained 2,433,019 trades and LeeReady correctly classified 81.1% of them. However, there is some evidence that the Lee-Ready classification is less accurate for HFT, as Chakrabarty et al. (2012) found when using TAQ data from INET for 342 stocks in NASDAQ, since the results showed that the Lee-Ready algorithm had misclassified 31% of all trades.
Data Sources and Data Pre-processing
The data used in this research are introduced in this section, together with a preliminary processing of Eurodollar Futures data. As previously stated, Eurodollar futures contracts are traded on the CME's Globex platform and CME pit (open-outcry) trades. Data for both electronic and open-outcry are directly obtained from the CME tapes for the period January 1, 1996 to January 1, 2014. Pit trades are quotes from CME by the ED code and GE for the Globex code; the amalgamated tapes are classified under the ED moniker. The volume ratio between the Globex and open-outcry is between three and four orders of magnitude over the sample, so separating the pit trades from the electronic trades currently appears to be less interesting. The CME tapes data for the 44 Eurodollar futures contracts available from the Thomson Reuter database via the Tick History system. We have conducted an analysis on the 4 monthly contracts, however the data is very sparse and the volumes are very small (up to 5 orders of magnitude for busy versus busy days) compared to the 40 quarterly contracts.
The data of the Eurodollar Futures trading are collected using the RICs (Reuter's Information Codes), which are quoted by financial institutions in the US Dollar exchanges. These 40 Eurodollar futures contracts are all Eurodollar transactions trading on the CME's Globex platform; they contain a maturity code, starting and ending dates, bid/ask price, bid/ask volume, trade prices and trade volume. The data pulled from the RIC information system, is a Computerized Trade Reconstruction (CTR) reported to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on instruments in the tag range set, are given a specific code, i.e. EDU0, EDU1,. . . , EDU9. The first two letters "ED" indicate Eurodollar futures, and the third letter "H, M, U, Z" indicates the delivery month of March, June, September and December respectively. The last character in the Eurodollar code, Table 4 ). Table 4 indicates the settlement year, the total volume of bid/asks, total number of bid/asks, total volume of trade and total number of trades for each Eurodollar futures contract. The data include all update-by-update inside quotes and trades for a total sample size of about 1 billion rows of prices and volumes in millisecond time-stamps and other trade information. This is believed to be an unprecedented microstructure data set as shown in Table 4 and Figure 4 .
Of the 40 Eurodollar future contracts, the largest bid volume is the EDZ3 contract at $83.84 quadrillion. EDH4 has both the highest ask volume at $92.80 quadrillion and the largest trade volume of $120 trillion. Meanwhile, the biggest number of bids and asks belongs to EDU5 with approximately 25 million for both bids and asks, while EDH9 and EDZ9 has the largest number of trades with about 1.95 million for both series of contracts. The total value of bid/asks and trade from January 1, 1996 to January 1, 2014 was $1.75 quintillion, $1.76 quintillion and $2.82 trillion, respectively. Furthermore, the total number of bid/asks and trades were approximately 831.36 million, 946.91 million and 63.83 million respectively.
Some information about the logistics of dealing with such a vast amount of data can now be provided. The raw data (uncompressed CSV files) comprised 489GB of best-bid, best offer and trade data, directly retrieved from the CME tapes. The raw tapes were streamed into a new format 'hdf5' which provided a high-integrity medium for this amount of data. Price and volume data were stored in a number format in order to reduce the amount of storage space as much as possible (e.g. prices were stored using IEEE single-precision numbers; volumes were stored at 16 bit integers). With compression, the raw 489GB was reduced to 40GB of compressed hdf5 data stored in separate files by maturity date, and then stored on a solid state drive. In the interests of speed, the data were replicated across three separate drives. The PIN calculations were computed for each day by multiple instances of Matlab, on a large multiprocessor workstation with 0.5TB of RAM and virtual memory. The total computation time was around three weeks.
Analysis and Implications
We will compute the PIN measure in the following sections using various rolling windows to record time series variation in the Eurodollar Futures PIN. Our estimated PIN averages over 0.5 for the majority of the sample and this is high relative to comparable equity market studies, see Table 5 . However, our results coincide with those of Dhatt et al. (2012) on the CME Globex trades within our sample and for the US Dollar Treasury note.
Although the PIN estimates range between 0.1 and 0.8 in the equities market, in the derivatives market the range is higher, with minimum and maximum values of 0.20 and 0.97, respectively. Also, in the derivatives market the min-max spread is higher than in the equities market, particularly in the interest rate derivatives market. The highest mean of PIN is appear in Dhatt et al. (2012) with value of 0.880 ;however, the highest actual value of PIN is show in our work with the maximum value of 0.992. Interestingly, value of PIN in Eurodollar Futures is higher than equity market and always high as in our work the PIN is mostly higher than 0.5 and in Dhatt et al. (2012) the PIN varies between 0.76 and 0.97. Given the higher PIN that appears in the Eurodollar market in both these cases, it would be interesting to investigate this in the future.
PIN analysis
The data for our 40 Eurodollar future contracts is separated into two different timeframes, the first of which was from January 1, 1996 to July 31, 2007, and the second, from August 1, 2007 to January 1, 2014. The descriptive statistics for each ED futures contract in the two periods are shown in Tables 6 and 7 .
In terms of the first period, the highest mean bid/ask spread belongs to EDU1, and EDZ0 has the highest mean trades returns. The smallest mean bid-ask spread belongs to EDH6, and EDU6 has the lowest mean trade returns. As for the second period, EDM7 presents both the largest mean spread and mean returns, while EDZ9 shows the lowest mean spread, EDZ9 shows the lowest mean spread, and EDM9 presents the lowest mean return.
Maximum Likelihood and PIN Estimation
The parameters of the PIN term structure model are estimated in this section. In fact, the trade process depends on four parameters -namely the probability of an information event; the probability of bad or good news; the arrival rate of informed traders; and the arrival rate of uninformed traders, presented as α, δ, µ and ε respectively. These parameters determine the probability of informed trading that is observed by order imbalance on information-based trading in the Eurodollar Futures market.
These four parameters of the trading process for each Eurodollar future series in a total of 40 data sets are estimated by maximizing the likelihood function, as described in Section 4. The mean estimate of the parameters and their standard deviation for each series are provided in Tables 8  and 9. Table 8 presents the results obtained from a preliminary analysis of the mean estimated parameters by Eurodollar futures series contracts.
The mean value of the information event parameter α for Eurodollar contracts is 0.6444, which indicates that, on average, 3/5 of trading days are information driven. The second information parameter in the PIN approach is δ, which is the probability of bad news, so that the signal is low (resp. high) during informed days with a probability δ (resp. 1 − δ). These results indicate that a high signal is observed with an estimated probability δ of 0.3517, and 1 − δ is 0.6483. This means that the order is more likely to be buy than sell when an information event occurs. Thus, traders tend to believe that information in trading day-driven orders reveals an excess liquidity in demand on the Eurodollar futures market more than supply.
Thirdly, the estimated mean value of the rate of arrival of the informed trader µ is 0.5604, which suggests that Eurodollar traders tend to believe that observed orders based on an informationdriven probability of 56.04% or just above half of the total orders that trade on the Eurodollar futures market come from informed traders.
Fourthly, the mean estimate ε is 0.54144, which indicates that the probability of liquidity trading is just above half. On informed days, the parameter ε represents the market liquidity that comes from uninformed traders, while on uninformed days, it coincides with the total liquidity available in the market because only uninformed traders have arrived in the market.
Having estimated the parameters α, δ, µ, ε, these four parameters are used to calculate the PIN. According to equation (4.12) where the probability of information-based trading is P IN = αµ αµ+2ε , the PIN depends on the arrival rate of informed and uninformed traders and the probability of the occurrence of an information event.
The average value of the probability of informed trading or PIN on the Eurodollar Futures market for the whole Eurodollar futures series contracts was also calculated, and the mean value Table 8 as 0.6882. This suggests that investors who trade in the Eurodollar futures market face a 68.82% probability of trading with a counter-party who is better informed about the direction of the key rate.
The mean value of parameters for all 40 Eurodollar futures contracts was also estimated (see Table 9 ). The results shown in Table 9 illustrate separate descriptive statistics of the PIN value and PIN parameters on 40 Eurodollar futures series contracts from January 1, 1996 to January 1, 2014. These results are consistent with those of Easley et al. (1996) , in that the parameters and the PIN measure are between 0 and 1. The interesting result in Table 9 is that the highest PIN value appears on EDH5 and EDM6 contracts, which have the same value of 0.7, and EDH2 has the lowest PIN value of 0.677 (see Table 9 ).
PIN and Eurodollar Futures
The next step is to analyse the way in which some events, such as turmoil in the financial market or maturity effects, which have taken place in the Eurodollar futures market may have affected the trading strategies, and also the probability of informed trading. In order to particularly assess the evolution of informed trading over time, the model parameters were estimated on samples using 78 overlapping days. Then the historical PIN was plotted separately into 10 sub-plots to illustrate the pattern of the PIN value. Each sub-plot contained four different ED contracts with an expiry date within the same years; for instance, the first sub-plot included EDH0, EDM0, EDU0 and EDZ0. These four ED contracts were due to expire in 2000 and 2010. The historical PIN is presented in Figure 5 . Surprisingly, a similar trend of PIN appears in all 10 sub-plots. Furthermore, some landmarks of the historical PIN are indicated to assess whether some turning points in the trend of the PIN can be associated with major events that took place in the Eurodollar market, as shown in Figure 5 .
Overall, the PIN estimates for the majority of Eurodollar futures contracts were high and widely fluctuated between 1996 and 2000; however a decreasing trend can be observed from 2002 until around 2005 for the majority of ED contracts and this was reversed to an upward trend between 2005 and 2006. Interestingly, this increasing trend after 2006 is before the sub-prime crisis. The PIN remained steady at around 0.6 from 2010 but was still below the historical PIN from the first period (1996-2000) (see Figure 5) .
We can see from Figure 6 that four particular events in the four periods appear to have exerted some influence on the historical development of the PIN. The first period that influenced the PIN was between 1996 and 2000, when the PIN widely and highly fluctuated. This can possibly be related to the fact that, in this period, the Eurodollar Futures market was not popular or traded less frequently than today. There were very few quotes and trade volumes in that period of timefor example, in the EDM series ( Figure 7) . As a result, the Eurodollar market was uncomplicated and it was easy for informed traders to manipulate it by modifying their trading behaviour to reflect a different degree of PIN. After this period, a decreasing trend of the PIN could be observed after 2002 and one possible explanation for this is that the number of quotes has increased rapidly, from The table presents the mean and standard deviations of parameters of the PIN model, and the mean value of PIN for 40 Eurodollar futures series contract. The parameter α represents the probability of an information event, δ is the probability of a low signal, µ is the rate of informed trade arrival, and ε is the rate of uninformed buy and sell trade arrivals. PIN is the probability of informed trading. This figure shows the historical value of PIN for four ED contracts (EDH5, EDM5, EDU5, EDZ5) with a timeline period that affects the change of PIN value. We plot the historical of PIN from 1996 to 2014, also we show the timeline of events that affect the PIN: first, the less-frequent trading period; second, increased frequency of trade after 2000; third, during the financial crisis; finally, after regulators fined the banks that were involved in LIBOR manipulation.
less than 100 per day to more than 10,000 per day and around 50 trades per day have increased to more than 1,000 per day. Therefore, these results of a decreasing PIN could be affected by more-frequent trading in futures contracts. The third period of historical events that affected the value of the PIN was the market turmoil. The sub-prime crisis mainly affected the money market and used the market to reduce the liquidity in the financial market. The PIN sharply decreased at the beginning of the financial turmoil, approximately in mid-2007, after which it PIN changed rapidly because of some spiking in most Eurodollar contracts. This was possibly affected by the reduced liquidity at the beginning of the crisis, and subsequently the panel bank tried to maintain the key interest rate in the LIBOR submission to protect the reputation of the banks, as explained in the next section.
The final event that affected the historical PIN occurred in 2012. This was when the CFTA and the FSA announced their order to Barclays Bank, UBS, RBS and Rabobank to pay a penalty for manipulating the LIBOR. The effect of the announcement was visible in the marked decrease of the PIN in 2012 and it became more stabilized in most ED futures contracts after 2013.
PIN and LIBOR Manipulation
The following reviews the anecdotal trends in the estimated PIN coefficients for the various contracts relative to the specific events catalogued in Table 3 versus the longer run patterns observed in the data over the 1996 to 2014 sample period. This section begins by comparing the historical PIN with specific events related to the LIBOR manipulation records. Since the LIBOR abuse was revealed by the US Department of Justice, FSA and CFTC investigations, we make the conjecture that individual events had an impact on the PIN in the Eurodollar futures market as the ED trading is based on this key rate. A closer look at the way in which the LIBOR investigation caused changes in the PIN begins with a document analysis using the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) document when the CFTC investigated some of the major banks, such as Barclays and RBS, regarding dishonest or manipulative submissions of the LIBOR rate. As previously noted, two epochs appear to be important in this context, first the pre-crisis attempts to generate competitive advantage directly in the banks proprietary interest rate trading positions and second after the crisis as a systematic attempt to reduce the perception of increased borrowing costs as part of a beauty contest designed to 'reassure' investors and regulators.
According to the CFTC settlement document, Barclays' traders had attempted to manipulate the US Dollar LIBOR from at least mid-2005 to the autumn of 2007, and sporadically thereafter until 2009. For instance, on November 28, 2007, Barclays's employees, including the bank's senior Treasury managers, submitted a US Dollar LIBOR rate that was higher than the actual rate and LIBOR abuse occurred on the following day and into early December 2007. 7 This activity is investigated in this study from the PIN value of the EDH8 contract, which had the closest expiry date series to this date. The PIN increased from November 24, 2007, when its value was 0.54 and reached a peak of 0.715 on December 15, 2007. There were many other instances of LIBOR abuse that can be illustrated by the movement of the PIN. The final notice from the Financial Services Authority (FSA) issued to Barclays Bank plc stated that at least 14 of the bank's interest rate derivatives traders had requested the LIBOR submitter to fix the LIBOR rate. However, this was not always done only to improve their trading position, but also sometimes to protect the bank's reputation. For instance, on February 5, 2008, Barclays' US Dollar Derivatives manager instructed traders to keep the LIBOR rate lower than the real rate to make the bank look healthier than usual during the financial turmoil. 8 It is interesting to see how this activity is reflected in the ED PIN to determine if the level of informed trading that occurred in the Eurodollar market during this period changed substantially. Prima facie evidence indicates that the LIBOR abuse appears to have possibly exerted some influence on the historical development of the PIN. The PINs of EDM8, EDU8, EDZ8 and EDH9 are used to indicate the LIBOR setting from February 5 to 11, 2008. Of course, the limitation of this study is that that we cannot identify the specific trades undertaken by the specific banks as this information is not available publicly. Barclays was not the only major high street bank involved in manipulating the LIBOR. Rabobank (Coöperative Central Raiffeisen Boerenleenbank B.A.), the Dutch multinational banking and financial services company headquartered in Utrecht was also guilty of this 'misdemeanour' and fined accordingly. According to the CFTC settlement report, CFTC (2013), the Rabobank LIBOR submitter submitted preferential rates in an attempt to manipulate the US Dollar LIBOR to benefit its trading position. In fact, Rabobank employees frequently attempted to manipulate the US Dollar LIBOR over a period from at least mid-2005 to at least late 2008. There are many examples of submitters being requested by traders to fix the LIBOR; for example, on September 07, 2007, Rabobank's senior US Dollar trader emailed the US Dollar submitter to keep the 3M US Dollar LIBOR high for the rest of the week. 9 The fact that this period was characterized by an increasing trend of the historical PIN is evidence that the Eurodollar futures market was affected by the setting of the LIBOR. This manipulation influence on the EDU7 contract, which expired on September 19, 2007 or just about two weeks after the event, is used to investigate this incident by matching it with the US Dollar LIBOR. The results indicate that, on September 07, 2007 the PIN had increased from 0.68 on September 6 to 0.7 and it was kept higher than 0.70 for the remainder of the week (see Figure 10) . The PIN reached a peak of 0.80 on September 17 and dropped to 0.695 on the following day. The historical PIN for this period could provide some evidence that the Eurodollar market had been manipulated by informed traders; moreover, another result is that the value of the PIN during this period was higher than average for EDU7 (0.6855).
Most of the LIBOR abuse activity that affected the Eurodollar futures trading occurred before and during the sub-prime crisis; however, one major event that had an impact on the LIBOR and Eurodollar Futures trading occurred much later, on February 28, 2012 when the US Department of Justice was conducting a criminal investigation into the LIBOR manipulation. Later that year, Barclays was the first bank to be fined $200 million by the CFTC, $160 million by the US Department of Justice, and £59.5 million by the UK's FSA for attempting to manipulate the key rate. Therefore, the Eurodollar Futures trading during this period is also investigated in this paper by simulating the PINs of EDH2, EDM2, EDU2 and EDZ2 contracts to compare them before, during and after 2012, when the LIBOR was manipulated. The action taken by the CFTC and FSA was a warning to traders to be wary of submitting an honest LIBOR rate and it should have reduced the instances of informed trading in the Eurodollar market. According to the investigation in this paper, there was significant drop in the PINs of these four contracts in mid-2012 (see Figure  11) , especially EDM2, which expired in June 2012 with a maturity date around three months after the regulators announcement.
The EDM2 PIN dropped by 24% from around 0.84 to 0.60 from the beginning of 2012 to the end of that year. The decrease of the PIN would have been affected by the investigation, lawsuit and fines for LIBOR manipulation by the CTFC and the FSA, which could have influenced some Figures 5 and 6 , the trend of the PIN also increased and remained high for the rest of that week. Since this trend could have been affected by the LIBOR abuse of Rabobank's employees, it is probably evidence to prove that the LIBOR was manipulated during this period. informed traders. This influence is illustrated by the significant change in the historical PIN in 2012 with the downward trend after the LIBOR investigation (see Figure 11) . Furthermore, after the LIBOR Regulation reform in July 2013, the PIN of every contract significantly dropped from around 0.68 to around 0.55 in the second half that year.
An interesting observation is that after the reform of the LIBOR fixing system and the exposure of bad practice, the PIN computed for the various Eurodollar contracts exhibits a steady decline with lower than the average value of 0.68 after 2013. However, given the degree of fluctuation in the PIN through time and across contracts, further analysis is needed to determine the persistence of this trend, see Figure 11 ).
PIN and the Maturity Date Effect
This section contains an illustration of the PIN before and after expiration to investigate the relationship between the PIN and the maturity date. The evolution of the PIN is plotted with the expiration date of all 40 Eurodollar contracts to illustrate how the PIN reacted before and after the maturity date. The most striking result to emerge from this figure is that, after the spiking of the PIN before the expiry date, there was an aggressive decline until the last trading day, and finally, another increase appears when the Eurodollar futures begin trading again on the day after the expiry date (see Figure 12 ). This pattern of the PIN appears in all 40 Eurodollar series contracts. Figure 11 : The probability of informed trading after LIBOR criminal investigation and reform.
This figure demonstrates the modification of the PIN in two periods, the first of which was after the PIN investigation and the announcement of fines imposed on Barclays, RBS, UBS and Rabo bank by the CFTC. There was a decreasing trend of the PIN in the first quarter of 2012, after the investigation of all ED contracts, followed by an upward trend from the last quarter of 2012 until mid-2013. The second period was after the LIBOR reform in mid-2013, when another downward trend of PIN appeared, probably as a result of the new law to protect the LIBOR from manipulation. The PIN in EDU8
The expiration date 16 September 1998
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The PINs for individual Eurodollar futures contacts are divided into two periods, the first of which is between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2007, while the second is between January 1, 2008 and December 31, 2013. The average value of the daily PINs was constructed for 60, 30, 20 and 10 days for fixed time windows around categories of identified events. The first identified sub-event was based on the regulatory activity around the current catalogue documenting LIBOR manipulation from the CFTC and the FSA, from Table 3 while the second was based on contract maturity dates by year (see Table 10 ).
In terms of the first sub-events, the average value of the PINs was not significantly different between 60, 30, 20 and 10 days for fixed time windows around regulatory based events. The smallest PINs appeared 10 days before the identified event for both the pre-2008 and post-2008 sample, whereas the highest PIN appeared 10 days after the event. Furthermore, in the pre-2008 period, the PINs slightly increased from the event date and reached a peak 60 days after the event with an average value of 0.7069.
As for the second sub-event, which was around the maturity date, the average PIN slightly increased from 60 days before the maturity date, and then the PIN dropped on the last trading day and increased again after the expiry date. Interestingly, the average PIN was identical on the maturity date, before and after 2008. Although there were slight differences in the evolution of the PIN for both regulatory-based events and around the maturity date, these differences were not found to be statistically significant (see Table 10 ). Comparison of the results of the mean value and standard deviation of the PIN 60, 30, 20 and 10 days before and after the events of LIBOR manipulation according to the CFTC and FSA documents, and also before and after the maturity date in two periods: from 1996 to the end of 2007 and from 2008 to the end of 2013.
Conclusions
We have undertaken an empirical microstructure analysis of the Eurodollar futures market, based around a rolling window adaptation of the model of Easley and O'Hara (1992) and Easley et al. (1996) . This is probably the first attempt to apply a simple sequential trade model to analyse the reaction between the probability of informed trading and market abuse based on manipulating the LIBOR for highly active derivatives markets, such as Eurodollar futures, or LIBOR-based derivatives traded on the CME's Globex platform. However, the difference between equity and derivatives markets should be considered.
Overall, the PIN appears to have dropped around the time of the sub-prime crisis (circa 2007) and then bounced back afterwards and sharply dropped again with the collapse of Lehman Brothers and then bounced back once again indicating that systematic market uncertainty has played a role in information asymmetry. The evolution of the PIN appears to vary systematically with maturity , since it dropped around the last trading day prior to maturity and then recovered when the Eurodollar futures resumed trading the following day. Significantly, the result of the PIN in this paper is always higher for the Eurodollar futures market than those recorded in the equity market (circa 0.4 to 0.8 versus 0.1 to 0.5; see Easley et al., 1996; Aslan et al., 2011; Abad and Yagüe, 2012) , however other PIN studies of interest rate derivatives have found similarly high, if not higher PIN measurements, in particular Dhatt et al. (2012) find the PIN for the Eurodollar market to be substantially higher on average than that detected in the equity and FX markets.
In summary, in terms of illustrating the presence of informed trading in the Eurodollar futures market, the initial results are somewhat inconclusive, when taken as a while. We find that in the lead up to some of the more blatant attempts at manipulating the LIBOR fix the PIN provides a good early warning signal. However, the average adjustments to the PIN relative to the dates recorded in the current catalogue of documentation from the CFTC and the FSA on LIBOR manipulation was not statistically significantly different relative to both the persistent variation relative to maturity and the general long-run variation in the PIN. This may be because the PIN approach was unsuitable or it was possibly used incorrectly for this type of data, or the LIBOR manipulation only had a minor effect. However, we leave full investigation of this issue to future work as more granularity emerges from the current round of court cases provides more direct evidence of channels of informed trading (thus allowing us to better the cases).
